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Abstract—Network attack is a significant security issue for
modern society. From small mobile devices to large cloud plat-
forms, almost all computing products, used in our daily life, are
networked and potentially under the threat of network intrusion.
With the fast-growing network users, network intrusions become
more and more frequent, volatile and advanced. Being able to
capture intrusions in time for such a large scale network is
critical and very challenging. To this end, the machine learning
(or AI) based network intrusion detection (NID), due to its
intelligent capability, has drawn increasing attention in recent
years. Compared to the traditional signature-based approaches,
the AI-based solutions are more capable of detecting variants
of advanced network attacks. However, the high detection rate
achieved by the existing designs is usually accompanied by
a high rate of false alarms, which may significantly discount
the overall effectiveness of the intrusion detection system. In
this paper, we consider the existence of spatial and temporal
features in the network traffic data and propose a hierarchical
CNN+RNN neural network, LuNet. In LuNet, the convolutional
neural network (CNN) and the recurrent neural network (RNN)
learn input traffic data in sync with a gradually increasing
granularity such that both spatial and temporal features of
the data can be effectively extracted. Our experiments on two
network traffic datasets show that compared to the state-of-the-
art network intrusion detection techniques, LuNet not only offers
a high level of detection capability but also has a much low rate
of false positive-alarm.
Keywords—network intrusion detection; convolutional neural net-
work; LuNet; recurrent neural network
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked computing becomes indispensable to people’s
life. From daily communications to commercial transactions,
from small businesses to large enterprises, all activities can
be or will soon be done through networked services. Any vul-
nerabilities in the networked devices and computing platforms
can expose the whole network under various attacks and may
bring about disastrous consequences. Hence, effective network
intrusion detection (NID) solutions are ultimately essential to
the modern society.
Initial NID designs are signature-based, where each type
of attacks should be manually studied beforehand, and the
detection is performed based on the attack’s signatures. This
kind of approaches are, however, not suitable to the fast-
growing network and cannot cope with attacks of increasing
volume, complexity and volatility.
For the security of such a large scale and ever-expanding
network, we need an intrusion detection system that is not
only able to quickly and correctly identify known attacks
but also adaptive and intelligent enough for the unknown
and evolved attacks, which leads to AI-based solutions. The
artificial intelligence gained from machine learning enables the
detection system to discover network attacks without much
need for human intervention [1].
So far, investigations on the AI-based solutions are mainly
based on two schemes: anomaly detection and misuse detec-
tion. The anomaly detection identifies an attack based on its
anomalies deviated from the profile of normal traffic. Never-
theless, this scheme may have a high false positive rate if the
normal traffic is not well profiled, and the profile used in the
detection is not fully representative [2]. Furthermore, to obtain
a fully representative normal traffic profile for a dynamically
evolving and expanding network is unlikely possible.
The misuse detection, on the other hand, focuses on the
abnormal behaviour directly. The scheme can learn features of
attacks based on a labelled training dataset, where both normal
and attacked traffic data are marked. Given sufficient labelled
data, a misuse-detection design can effectively generate an
abstract hypothesis of the boundary between normal and mali-
cious traffic. The hypothesis can then be used to detect attacks
for future unknown traffic. Therefore the misuse detection is
more feasible and effective than the anomaly detection [2], [3]
and has been adopted in real-world systems, such as Google,
Qihoo 360 and Aliyun.
However, the existing misuse detection designs still present
a high false positive rate, which significantly limits the in-time
detection efficiency, incurs large manual scrutiny workload,
and potentially degrades the network-wide security. In this
paper, we address this issue, and we aim for an improved
misuse detection design. Our contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We present a hierarchical deep neural network, LuNet,
that is made of multiple levels of combined convolution
and recurrent sub-nets; At each level, the input data are
learned by both CNN and RNN nets; As the learning
progresses from the first level to the last level, the learning
granularity becomes increasingly detailed. With such an
arrangement, the synergy of CNN and RNN can be
effectively exploited for both spatial and temporal feature
extractions.
• We provide an in-depth analysis and discussion for the
configuration of LuNet so that a high learning efficiency
can be achieved.
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We test our design on two network intrusion datasets, NSL-
KDD and UNSW-NB15, and we demonstrate that our design
offers a higher detection capability (namely, better detection
rate and validation accuracy) while maintaining a significantly
lower false positive rate when compared to a set of state-of-
the-art machine learning based designs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II provides a brief background of machine learning for network
intrusion detection. The design of LuNet is detailed in Section
III. The threat model in the datasets used for LuNet design is
presented in Section IV. The evaluation and comparison of
LuNet with other state-of-the-art designs are given in Section
V. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Many algorithms have been developed for machine learn-
ing. They can be classified into classical machine learning
approaches and deep learning approaches. Some of them,
relevant to network intrusion detection are briefly discussed
below.
A. Classical Machine Learning Approaches
Among many machine learning approaches [4], kernel ma-
chines and ensemble classifiers are two effective schemes that
can be considered for NID. Support Vector Machine (SVM)
that has long been used for task classification is a typical
example of kernel machines, and Radial Basis Function (RBF)
kernel (also called Gaussian kernel) is the most used kernel
function [5]. SVM makes the data that cannot be linearly
separated in the original space, separable by projecting the
data to a higher-dimension feature space. Ensemble classifiers,
such as Adaptive Boosting [6], Random Forest [7], are often
constructed with multiple weak classifiers to avoid overfitting
during training so that a more robust classification function
can be achieved.
However, both kernel machines and ensemble classifiers
are not scalable to a large data set. Their validation accuracy
rarely scales with the size of training data [8]. Given a high
volume of training data available from the large scale network,
using these traditional machine learning approaches to train
the intrusion detection system is not efficient. Furthermore,
the traditional approaches learn input data only based on a
given set of features; they cannot generalize features from raw
data, and their learning efficiency highly relies on the features
specified.
B. Deep Learning Approaches
Deep learning organizes “learning algorithms” in layers in
the form of “artificial neural network” that can learn and make
intelligent decisions on its own.
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) [9] is an early class of feed-
forward deep neural network that utilizes the backpropagation
algorithm to minimize the error rate during training. MLP
was initially used to solve complex approximate problems for
speech recognition, image recognition, and machine transla-
tion.
The real flourish and practical breakthrough of deep learning
stems from two popular deep learning algorithms: the convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network
(RNN). CNN can automatically extract features of raw data
and has gained great successes for image recognition [10],
[11], [12]. However, the feature map generated by CNN often
manifests the spatial relations of data. CNN does not work
very well for the data of long-range dependency.
RNN, on the other hand, has an ability to extract the tem-
poral features from the input data. Long short-term memory
(LSTM) is a popular RNN [13]. It keeps a trend of the long-
term relationship in the sequential data while being able to
drop out short-lived temporal noises.
Recently, a hierarchical convolutional and recurrent neural
network, HAST-IDS [14] has been used to learn spatial and
temporal features from the network traffic data.
The LuNet proposed in this paper is also a hierarchical
network. Our design is similar to HAST-IDS in that both
utilize CNN and RNN for spatial-temporal feature extraction.
However, there are some major differences:
1) HAST-IDS stacks all RNN layers after CNN layers,
while LuNet has a hierarchy of combined CNN and
RNN layers.
2) In HAST-IDS, because the CNN hierarchy is placed
before RNN, the deep CNN may drop out the temporal
information embedded in the raw input data, which
makes RNN learning ineffective. LuNet, on the other
hand, synchronizes both the CNN learning and the RNN
learning into multiple steps with the learning granularity
being gradually increased from coarse to fine; Therefore,
both spatial and temporal features can be adequately
captured.
3) We apply batch normalization between CNN and RNN
so that the learning efficiency and accuracy can be
further improved.
The design of LuNet is presented in the next section.
III. LUNET
A. Overview Structure
As stated above, CNN targets on spatial features while RNN
aims for temporal features. The existing design HAST-IDS
simply structures CNN and RNN in tandem, as illustrated in
Fig.1(a). When the learning progresses along the multiple lev-
els in the CNN hierarchy, the information extracted becomes
more spatial oriented. The temporal features may be lost by
the CNN hierarchy, which significantly limits the learning
effectiveness of the following RNN (LSTM).
Rather than allow CNN to learn to its full extent first, in
LuNet, we mingle the CNN and RNN subnets and synchronize
both the CNN learning and the RNN learning into multiple
steps and each step is performed by a combined CNN and
RNN block, or LuNet block, as illustrated in Fig.1(b). Since
CNN is able to extract high-level features from a large amount
of data, we place CNN before RNN at each level. The learning
starts from the first step on coarse-grain learning, hence the
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Fig. 2: LuNet. (a) a LuNet Block. (b) the overall deep
architecture of LuNet.
CNN output will still retain temporal information that will
then be captured by RNN. The learning granularity becomes
detailed as the data processing flows to the next step; but
at each level, both CNN and RNN learn input on the same
granularity. In such a way, CNN and RNN can learn to their
full capacity without much interference with each other.
Given the overall structure of LuNet, the effectiveness of its
learning is closely related to the hidden layers design, which
is discussed in the next sub section.
B. Hidden Layers Design
We measure the learning granularity in terms of the number
of filters/cells used in the CNN/RNN network. The smaller
the filter/cell number, the larger the granularity. Fig.2 shows
a LuNet with three CNN+RNN levels. The filter/cell number
increases from 64 for the first level to 256 for the last level.
The design considerations for each layer in a LuNet block
and the final four processing layers for the learning outputs,
as highlighted in shaded boxes in Fig.2, are given below.
1) Convolutional Neural Network (CNN): CNN mainly
consists of two operations: convolution and pooling. Convolu-
tion transforms input data, through a set of filters or kernels,
to an output that highlights the features of the input data,
hence the output is usually called feature map. The convolution
output is further processed by an activation function and then
down-sampled by pooling to trim off irrelevant data. Pooling
also helps to remove glitches in the data to improve the
learning for the following layers [15], [16].
CNN learns the input data by adjusting the filters automati-
cally through rounds and rounds of learning processes so that
its output feature map can effectively represent the raw input
data.
Since the network packet is presented in a 1D format, we
use 1D convolution1 in LuNet, as illustrated in Formula (1)
that specifies the operation to the input vector g with a filter
f of size m.
(f ∗ g)(i) =
m∑
j=1
g(j) · f(i− j +m/2), (1)
where i is the position of different values in the sequence data.
Because the rectified linear unit (ReLU): f(z) = max(0, z)
is good for fast learning convergence, we therefore, choose
it as the activation function. We also use the max pooling
operation, as commonly applied in other existing designs [17].
2) Batch Normalization: One problem with using the deep
neural network is that the input value range dynamical changes
from layer to layer during training, which is also known
as covariance shift. The covariance shift causes the learning
efficiency of one layer dependent on other layers, making
the learning outcome unstable. Furthermore, because of the
covariance shift, the learning rate is likely restricted to a
low value to ensure data in different input ranges to be
effectively learned, which slows down the learning speed.
Batch normalization can be used to address this issue.
Normalization scales data to the unit norm in the input layer
and has been used to accelerate training deep neural network
for image recognition [18].
We use batch normalization to adjust the CNN output for
RNN in a LuNet block. The normalization subtracts the batch
mean from each data and divides the result by the batch
standard deviation, as given in Formula (2).
xˆ =
x− µB√
δ2B + 
, (2)
1One issue involved in convolution multiplication is to maintain the kernel
size as same as the input, for which two typical schemes can be used: zero
or no-zero padding. Since both schemes do not generate much difference to
the learning outcome, here we choose no-zero padding for simplicity.
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Fig. 3: A high level data processing diagram of LSTM.
where x is a value in the input batch, and µB and δB
are, respectively, the batch mean and variance. The  is an
ignorable value, just to ensure the denominator in the formula
non-zero.
Based on the normalized xˆ, the normalization produces the
output y as given in Formula (3), where the γ and β will be
trained in the learning process for a better learning outcome.
yˆ = γxˆ+ β. (3)
3) Long Short Term Memory (LSTM): Different from CNN
that learns information on an individual-data-record basis,
RNN can establish the relationship between data records by
feeding back what has been learned from the previous learning
to the current learning, and hence can capture the temporal
features in the input data.
However, the simple feedback used in the traditional RNN
may have a learning error accumulated in the long depen-
dency. The accumulated errors may become large enough to
invalid the final learning outcome. LSTM (Long Short-Term
Memory), a gated recurrent neural network, mitigates such a
problem. It controls the feedback with a set of gate functions
such that the short-lived errors are eventually dropped out and
only persistent features are retained. Therefore, we use LSTM
for RNN.
For a brief description of LSTM operation, we create a high-
level data processing diagram of LSTM 2
LSTM can be abstracted as a connection of four sub-
networks (denoted as p-net, g-net, f-net and q-net in the
diagram), a set of control gates, and a memory component.
The input and output values in the diagram are vectors of the
same size determined by the input x(t). The state, s(t), saved
in the memory, serves as the feedback to the current learning.
All the sub nets in LSTM have a similar structure, as
specified in Formula (4).
b+ U × x(t) +W × h(t− 1), (4)
where x(t), h(t − 1), b, U and W are, respectively, current
input, previous output, bias, weight matrix for the current
2For the mathematical design details of LSTM, the reader is referred to the
original paper [16] as shown in Fig. 3.
input, and recurrent weight matrix for the previous output.
Each of the four nets have a different b, U , and W .
The outputs from the sub nets (p(t), g(t), f(t) and q(t)) are
then used, through two types of controlling gates (σ and tanh)
to determine the feedback s(t) from the previous learning and
the current output h(t), as given in Formulas (5) and ( 6),
respectively.
s(t) = σ(f(t)) ∗ s(t− 1) + σ(p(t)) ∗ tanh g(t), (5)
h(t) = tanh s(t) ∗ σ(q(t)). (6)
LSTM learns the inputs by adjusting the weights in those
nets and the σ value such that the temporal features between
the input data can be effectively generated in the output.
4) Dimension Reshape: Since in LuNet, the learning gran-
ularity changes from one CNN+RNN level to another, the
output size of one level is different from the input size
expected at the next level. We, therefore, add a layer to reshape
the data for the next LuNet block.
5) Overfitting Prevention: One typical problem when learn-
ing big data using a deep neural network is overfitting –
namely, the network has learned the training data too well,
which restricts its ability to identify variants in new samples.
This problem can be handled by Dropout [19]. Dropout
randomly removes some connections from the deep neural
network to reduce overfitting. We add the dropout layer with
a default rate value of 0.5 after the CNN+RNN hierarchy in
LuNet.
6) Final Layers: Finally, an extra convolution layer and a
global average pooling layer are used to extract further spatial-
temporal features learned through the LuNet blocks. The final
learning output is generated by the last layer, a fully-connected
layer.
IV. DATASETS AND THREAT MODEL
The evaluation of a neural network design is closely related
to the dataset used. Many datasets collected for NID con-
tain significant amount of redundant data [20], [21], which
makes evaluation results unreliable [5], [6], [7], [14], [22].
To ensure the effectiveness of the evaluation, we select two
non-redundant datasets: NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 in our
investigation.
NSL-KDD [23] was generated by Canadian Institute for
Cyber Security (CICS) from the original KDD’99 dataset.
It consists of 39 different types of attacks. The attacks are
categorized into four groups: Denial of Service (DoS), User
to Root (U2R), Remote to Local (R2L) and Probe. A big
issue with this dataset is its imbalanced distribution, which
often leads to a high false positive rate due to insufficient data
available for training [24], [25]. Here, we tackle this problem
with a cross-validation scheme3.
UNSW-NB15 [27], [28], generated by Australian Center
for Cyber Security (ACCS) in 2015, is a more contemporary
dataset. For the dataset, the attack samples were first collected
3This problem was also addressed in [26] with a different focus and strategy.
0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 229 10 0 0 1 1 0.04 0.06 0 255 10 0.04 0.06 0 0 0 0 1 1 DoS
1 tcp telnet RSTO 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0.12 1 0.5 1 0 0.75 29 86 0.31 0.17 0.03 0.02 0 0 0.83 0.71 Probe
0 icmp eco_i SF 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 65 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 57 1 0 1 0.28 0 0 0 Probe
0 tcp telnet SF 129 174 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 R2L
0 icmp ecr_i SF 520 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 511 511 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 59 1 0 1 0.14 0 0 0 0 DoS
……………..
805 tcp http RSTR 76944 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 241 238 0.99 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.07 DoS
0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 483 1 0.05 0 0.92 1 0 1 0 255 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.96 1 Probe
8 tcp ftp SF 220 688 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 53 27 0.51 0.08 0.02 0 0 0 0 U2R
0 udp private SF 105 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 9 1 0 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 R2L
……………..
280 tcp ftp_data SF 283618 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 10 0.86 0.29 0.86 0.2 0 0 0 0 R2L
0 tcp http SF 320 1667 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 30 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 85 253 1 0 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 0 Normal
8092 tcp telnet SF 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 67 0.26 0.03 0 0 0 0.01 0.11 0.19 DoS
0 tcp http SF 54540 83314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 255 254 1 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.07 DoS
(a)
1.227654 tcp http FIN 10 10 902 1050 15.47667 62 252 5291.393 … 1 61 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 DoS
0.000006 unas - INT 2 0 200 0 166666.7 254 0 1.33E+08 … 100 0 0 0 9 2 3 3 3 10 0 0 0 12 9 0 Exploits
……………..
0.000006 nvp - INT 2 0 180 0 166666.7 254 0 1.2E+08 … 90 0 0 0 10 2 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 0 Fuzzers
0.000003 unas - INT 2 0 200 0 333333.3 254 0 2.67E+08 … 100 0 0 0 5 2 3 3 3 5 0 0 0 3 5 0 Reconnaissance
……………..
0.000005 larp - INT 2 0 200 0 200000 254 0 1.6E+08 … 100 0 0 0 6 2 2 2 2 6 0 0 0 11 6 0 Analysis
0.000005 udp - INT 2 0 92 0 200000 254 0 73600000 … 46 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 19 1 0 Worms
0.811971 tcp - FIN 10 8 542 354 20.93671 254 252 4808.053 … 54 44 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0  1 3 Shellcode
…………….
0.000002 udp dns INT 2 0 114 0 500000 254 0 2.28E+08 … 57 0 0 0 7 2 7 7 4 7 0 0 0 8 7 0 Generic
…………….
0.22383 tcp ftp-data FIN 8 12 424 8824 84.88585 31 29 13260.06 … 53 735 0 0 3 0 6 1 1 4 0 0 0 4 3 0 Normal
1.009718 st2 - INT 4 0 360 0 2.971127 254 0 2139.211 … 90 0 0 0 3 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 Backdoor
(b)
Fig. 4: Raw network traffic data. (a) NSL-KDD (41 features),
(b) UNSW-NB15 (42 features).
from the three real-world websites: CVE (Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exposures)4, BID (Symantec Corporation)5, and
MSD (Microsoft Security Bulletin)6. The sample attacks were
then simulated in a laboratory environment for the dataset
generation. There are nine attack categories in UNSW-NB15:
DoS, Exploits, Generic, Shellcode, Reconnaissance, Backdoor,
Worms, Analysis, and Fuzzers.
V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
To evaluate our design, we have implemented LuNet (as
given in Fig. 2) with TensorFlow backend, Keras and scikit-
learn packages and we run the training on a HP EliteDesk
800 G2 SFF Desktop with Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-6500 CPU
@ 3.20 GHz processor and 16.0 GB RAM. For comparison,
we also implemented a set of state-of-the-art machine learning
algorithms.
The description of experiments and experiment results and
discussion are presented below.
A. Data Preprocessing
1) Convert Categorical Features: For the experiment to
be effective, we need data to conform to the input format
required by the neural network. Raw network traffic data
include some categorical features as shown in Fig.4. The
text information cannot be processed by a learning algorithm
and should be converted into numerical values. Here, we use
the ’get dummies’ function in Pandas [29] to operate the
conversion.
4CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/
5BID: https://www.securityfocus.com
6MSD: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins
TABLE I: RESULT OF BINARY CLASSIFICATION
k
NSL-KDD UNSW-NB15
DR% ACC% FPR% DR% ACC% FPR%
2 98.55 99.09 0.41 98.50 96.65 6.60
4 98.56 99.11 0.37 98.04 97.51 3.44
6 99.18 99.30 0.59 98.12 97.62 3.26
8 99.27 99.34 0.59 97.78 97.67 2.54
10 99.00 99.36 0.7 98.45 97.57 3.96
average 99.42 99.24 0.53 98.18 97.40 3.96
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Fig. 5: A comparison of detection rate (DR%) and false
positive rate (FPR%) on using LuNet for binary classification
based on NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets.
2) Standardization: Input data may have varied distribu-
tions with different means and standard derivations, which may
affect learning efficiency. We apply standardization to scale the
input data to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1,
as is often applied in many machine learning classifiers.
3) Stratified K-Fold Cross Validation: NSL-KDD and
UNSW-NB15 contain 148,516 and 257,673 samples, respec-
tively. To realize the large non-redundant data for training and
verification, we employ a Stratified K-Fold Cross Validation
strategy, also commonly used in machine learning. The scheme
splits all samples in a dataset into k groups; Among them, k−1
groups, as a whole, are used for training and the rest one group
for validation; hence the strategy is also called Leave One Out
Strategy.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate LuNet in terms of the validation accuracy
(ACC), detection rate (DR) and false positive rate (FPR). ACC
measures LuNet’s ability to correctly predict both attacked and
non-attacked normal traffic, while DR indicates its ability of
prediction for attacks only. A high DR can be shadowed by a
high rate of false positive alarm (FPR), which therefore needs
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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70
80
90
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D
R
%
A Comparsion of DR (%) on NSL-KDD 
2 4 6 8 10
K-Value
0
0.5
1
1.5
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FP
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%
A Comparsion of FPR (%) on NSL-KDD 
Normal
DoS
Probe
R2L
U2R
Fig. 6: A comparison of detection rate (DR%) and false posi-
tive rate (FPR%) on using LuNet for multi-class classification
based on NSL-KDD.
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0
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4
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%
A Comparsion of FPR (%) on UNSW-NB15
Fig. 7: A comparison of detection rate (DR%) and false posi-
tive rate (FPR%) on using LuNet for multi-class classification
based on UNSW-NB15.
to be jointly considered with DR. The detail definitions of the
three metrics are given in Formulas (7), (8) and (9).
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (7)
DR =
TP
TP + FN
, (8)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
, (9)
where TP and TN are, respectively, the number of attacks and
the number of normal traffic correctly classified; FP is the
TABLE II: RESULT OF MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
k
NSL-KDD UNSW-NB15
DR% ACC% FPR% DR% ACC% FPR%
2 99.24 99.09 0.98 95.37 84.61 1.69
4 98.15 98.88 0.33 95.08 84.78 1.45
6 99.11 99.13 0.77 96.10 84.93 2.09
8 98.68 99.02 0.58 95.83 85.21 1.32
10 99.02 99.14 0.61 97.43 85.35 2.89
average 98.84 99.05 0.65 95.96 84.98 1.89
number of actual normal records mis-classified as attacks, and
FN is the number of attacks falsely classified as normal traffic.
C. LuNet Results
In our experiments, we use RMSprop [30] (a popular
gradient descent algorithm) to optimize weights and biases
for LuNet training, and for the learning rate, we set it to a
median value 0.001 in a range given by the tensorflow library.
We also choose the default rate value, 0.5, for the dropout
layer.
We first measure the performance of LuNet based on two
scenarios: (1) binary classification, namely LuNet predicts a
packet either as an attack or as a normal traffic; (2) multi-
class classification, where LuNet identifies a packet either as
normal or as one type of attacks given in the dataset attack
model (namely, 5 classes for NSL-KDD and 10 classes for
UNSW-NB15). The experiment results are given below.
1) Binary Classification: Table I shows the detection rate,
accuracy and false positive rate for the binary classification
of LuNet under different Stratified K-Fold Cross Validations,
with k ranging from 2 to 10. The average values are given
in the last row of the table. As can be seen from the table,
LuNet can achieve around 99.24% and 97.40% validation
accuracy on NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15, respectively. The
best validation accuracy of 99.36% on the NSL-KDD dataset
and 97.67% on the UNSW-NB15 can be observed. It can
also be seen that LuNet offers a high detection capability
while incurs a low false positive alarm rate, as plotted Fig.5.
On average, DR=99.42% and FPR=0.53% for NSL-KDD,
and DR=98.18% and FPR=3.96% on UNSW-NB15 can be
obtained.
It is worth to note that because of the cross-validation used,
the false positive alarm rate is not affected by the imbalanced
NSL-KDD dataset, as is expected.
2) Multi-Class Classification: Table II shows the multi-
class classification results. It can be seen from the table that
LuNet can achieve an average of 99.05% accuracy, 98.84% de-
tection rate on NSL-KDD, and 84.98% accuracy and 95.96%
detection rate on UNSW-NB15 with, respectively, the 0.65%
and 1.89% false positive rate on the two datasets.
Fig.6 shows the detection rate (DR%) and false positive
rate (FPR%) for 5 category (Normal, DoS, Probe, R2L, U2R)
classification on NSL-KDD. As we can see from the figure,
Fig. 8: The confusion matrix of using LuNet on the UNSW-
NB15 data set when k = 10 for multi-class classification.
TABLE III: A COMPARISON OF 8 ALGORITHMS FOR
MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFICATION BASED ON UNSW-NB15
DATASET WITH K = 10 FOR CROSS VALIDATION
Algorithm DR% ACC% FPR%
ML
SVM (RBF) 83.71 74.80 7.73
RF 92.24 84.59 3.01
AdaBoost 91.13 73.19 22.11
average 89.03 77.53 10.95
DL
CNN 92.28 82.13 3.84
MLP 96.74 84.00 3.66
LSTM 92.76 82.40 3.63
HAST-IDS 93.65 80.03 9.60
LuNet 97.43 85.35 2.89
average 94.57 82.78 4.72
LuNet shows an excellent capability to handle attacks in all
categories (with a high detection rate and low false positive
rate), except for U2R and R2L. For U2R and R2L, LuNet
presents a relatively low detection rate, which indicates that
the main features extracted by LuNet for U2R and R2L
are not effectively distinct. There may be significant feature
overlap between U2R and other attacks. The same reason is
also applied to the Backdoor and Worms attacks, as mani-
fested in the similar plot shown in Fig.7 for classification
of 10 categories (Normal, Analysis, Backdoor, DoS, Ex-
ploits, Fuzzers, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode, Worms)
on UNSW-NB15.
Fig.7 illustrates that LuNet can successfully detect most
of the Normal traffic, Exploits, Generic, DoS, Shellcode and
Reconnaissance attacks (see the overlapped lines at the very
top of the plots) and has a moderate capability to detect
Analysis attacks with the low false positive rate (FPR). How-
ever, it is unable to discover Backdoor and Worms attacks,
as can be observed in the confusion matrix (as shown in
Fig. 8) generated from the experiment. We discover that most
of Backdoor and Worms were, in fact, classified as Exploits
attacks by LuNet. The possible reason is that the Backdoor and
Worms attacks use the common exploit flaws in the programs
that listen for connections from remote hosts and the signature
of those attacks is similar to the Exploits attacks. Therefore,
the Backdoor and Worms attacks are treated as the Exploits
attacks by LuNet. Another possible reason may come from
the insufficient data available for the Backdoor and Worms
attacks; There are only around 1.4% Backdoor attacks and
1.1% Worms attacks in the dataset.
D. Comparative Study
We compare the performance of LuNet with other five state-
of-the-art supervised learning algorithms that have been inves-
tigated in the literature: Support Vector Machine (SVM) with
Gaussian Kernel (RBF) [5], Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
[31], Random Forest (RF) [7], Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost)
[6], and HAST-IDS [14].
We also run the experiment on individual CNN and LSTM
networks, presented in LuNet.
The detection rate (DR%), accuracy (ACC%), and false
positive rate (FPR%) of the two design groups (ML, the clas-
sical machine learning algorithms and DL, the deep learning
algorithms) are given in Table III. The average values of each
group are also provided in the table.
As can be seen from Table III, the deep neural networks
generally have better performance than the three classical
machine learning algorithms; On average, the deep neural
networks have a higher detection rate (94.57%) and accuracy
(82.78%) and a lower false positive rate (4.72%), as compared
to the corresponding average values of 89.03%, 77.53% and
10.95% from the classical machine learning. Among the five
deep learning networks, LuNet is better than other four DL
algorithms due to the special combined CNN+RNN hierar-
chy used. In summary, LuNet demonstrates its superiority –
achieving a high detection rate and accuracy, while keeping a
low false positive rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a deep neural network architecture,
LuNet, to detect intrusions on a large scale network. LuNet
uses CNN to learn spatial features in the traffic data and LSTM
for temporal features. To avoid the information loss due to
different learning focuses of CNN and RNN, we synchronize
both CNN and RNN to learn the input data at the same
granularity. To enhance the learning, we also incorporate batch
normalization in the design. Our experiments on the two
non-redundant datasets, NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15, show
that LuNet is able to effectively take advantages of CNN
and LSTM. Compared with other state-of-the-art techniques,
LuNet can significantly improve the validation accuracy and
reduce the false positive rate for network intrusion detection.
It must be pointed out that LuNet does not work well to
classify attacks of insufficient samples in the training dataset,
such as Backdoors and Worms, as observed in our experiment,
which will be investigated in the future.
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